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Abstract
The robustness to the prior of Bayesian inference procedures based on a
measure of statistical evidence are considered. These inferences are shown
to have optimal properties with respect to robustness. Furthermore, a
connection between robustness and prior-data conflict is established. In
particular, the inferences are shown to be effectively robust when the
choice of prior does not lead to prior-data conflict. When there is prior-
data conflict, however, robustness may fail to hold.
1 Introduction
Robustness to the choice of the prior is an issue of considerable importance in a
Bayesian statistical analysis. If an inference is very sensitive to the choice of the
prior, then this could be viewed as either a negative for the inference method
being used or for the choice of prior. In this paper it is shown that certain
inferences are in a sense optimally robust to the choice of the prior. Furthermore,
when the sensitivity of the inferences to the prior is measured quantitatively, it
is shown that there is an intimate connection between the effective robustness
of the inferences and whether or not there is prior-data conflict. So by choice of
the inferential methodology and the avoidance of prior-data conflict, robustness
of the inferences to the choice of prior is achieved.
The basic ingredients for a statistical analysis are taken here to be the data
x, a statistical model {fθ : θ ∈ Θ}, where each fθ is a probability density with
respect to volume measure µ on the sample space X , and a proper prior density π
with respect to volume measure ν on Θ. Note that volume measure on a discrete
set is taken to be counting measure. Furthermore, suppose that interest is in
making inferences about the quantity ψ = Ψ(θ) where Ψ : Θ → Ψ is onto and
we don’t distinguish between the function and its range to save notation.
Let πΨ(· |x) and πΨ denote the posterior and prior densities of ψ where
these are both taken with respect to support measure νΨ on Ψ. It follows that,
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under smoothness assumptions, πΨ(ψ) =
∫
Ψ−1{ψ}
π(θ)JΨ(θ) νΨ−1{ψ}(dθ) where
JΨ(θ) = (det(dΨ(θ)◦(dΨ(θ))
t)−1/2, dΨ is the differential of Ψ and νΨ−1{ψ} is vol-
ume measure on Ψ−1{ψ}. Also, πΨ(ψ |x) =
∫
Ψ−1{ψ} π(θ |x)JΨ(θ) νΨ−1{ψ}(dθ)
where π(θ |x) = π(θ)fθ(x)/m(x), with m(x) =
∫
Θ π(θ)fθ(x) ν(dθ), is the pos-
terior density of θ with respect to ν. Note that m is the prior predictive den-
sity of the data with respect to µ. The conditional prior of θ given ψ = Ψ(θ)
has density π(θ |ψ) = π(θ)JΨ(θ)/πΨ(ψ) with respect to νΨ−1{ψ} on the set
Ψ−1{ψ}. The conditional prior predictive density of x is then given bym(x |ψ) =∫
Ψ−1{ψ}
π(θ |ψ)fθ(x) νΨ−1{ψ}(dθ). A simple argument, see Baskurt and Evans
(2013), gives the Savage-Dickey ratio result that
πΨ(ψ |x)
πΨ(ψ)
=
m(x |ψ)
m(x)
, (1)
which has some use in the developments here.
Robustness to the prior has been considered by many authors and there are a
number of different approaches. Many discussions are concerned with determin-
ing the range of values that some characteristic of interest takes when the prior
is allowed to vary over some class. Berger (1990, 1994) contain broad reviews
of work on this topic and Rios Insua and Ruggeri (2000) is a collection of pa-
pers by key contributors. Dey and Birmiwal (1994) considers global robustness
measures based upon measures of distance from the posterior distribution.
The approach taken here is to study robustness to the prior for relative belief
inferences for ψ rather than all possible inferences. Relative belief inferences are
based on the relative belief ratio defined
RBΨ(ψ |x) = lim
δ→0
ΠΨ (Nδ(ψ) |x)
ΠΨ (Nδ(ψ))
(2)
whenever this limit exists for a sequence of neighborhoods Nδ(ψ) of ψ con-
verging nicely to ψ (see Rudin (1974) for the definition of ’converging nicely’).
Under mild regularity conditions the limit exists and is given by RBΨ(ψ |x) =
πΨ(ψ |x)/πΨ(ψ). Since RBΨ(ψ |x) measures the change in belief that ψ is the
true value it is a measure of evidence. Here RBΨ(ψ |x) > 1 means that there
is evidence in favor of ψ being the true value, as belief in ψ has increased after
seeing the data, and RBΨ(ψ |x) < 1 means that there is evidence against ψ be-
ing the true value, as belief in ψ has decreased after seeing the data. Section 2
provides some more details concerning relative belief inferences for both estima-
tion and hypothesis assessment but also see Baskurt and Evans (2013). Results
in Section 3 establish that these inferences have optimal robustness properties
when the marginal prior for ψ is allowed to vary over all possibilities in the class
of ǫ-contaminated priors. This generalizes results found in Wasserman (1989),
Ruggeri and Wasserman (1993) and de la Horra and Fernandez (1994). Fur-
thermore, an ambiguity concerning the interpretation of the results is resolved.
As such this provides further justifications for these inferences.
While inferences may be optimally robust, this does not imply that they are
in fact robust. In Section 4 quantitative measures of the sensitivity of relative
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belief inferences to both the marginal prior of ψ and the conditional prior for θ
given Ψ(θ) = ψ are derived. In Section 5 it is shown that these inferences are in-
deed robust when the base prior π does not suffer from prior-data conflict. This
adds weight to arguments concerning the importance of checking for prior-data
conflict before reporting inferences, as prior-data conflict can imply sensitivity
of the inferences to the choice of the prior. Prior-data conflict is interpreted
as the true value lying in the tails of the prior and consistent methods have
been developed for assessing this in Evans and Moshonov (2006) and Evans and
Jang (2011a). Methodology for modifying a prior when prior-data conflict is
encountered, through the selection of a prior weakly informative with respect
to the base prior, is developed in Evans and Jang (2011b).
2 Relative Belief Inferences
When RBΨ(ψ |x) > 1 this is the factor by which prior belief in the truth of ψ has
increased after seeing the data. Clearly the bigger RBΨ(ψ |x) the more evidence
there is in favor of ψ while, when RBΨ(ψ |x) < 1, the smaller RBΨ(ψ |x) is the
more evidence there is against ψ. This leads to a total preference ordering on
Ψ, namely, ψ1 is not preferred to ψ2 whenever RBΨ(ψ1 |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ2 |x) since
there is at least as much evidence for ψ2 as there is for ψ1. This in turn leads
to unambiguous solutions to inference problems.
The best estimate of ψ is the value for which the evidence is greatest, namely,
ψ(x) = arg supRBΨ(ψ |x).
Associated with this estimate is a γ-relative belief credible region CΨ,γ(x) = {ψ :
RBΨ(ψ |x) ≥ cΨ,γ(x)} where cΨ,γ(x) = inf{k : ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ k |x) ≥ 1−γ}.
Notice that ψ(x) ∈ CΨ,γ(x) for every γ ∈ [0, 1] and so, for selected γ, the
size of CΨ,γ(x) can be taken as a measure of the accuracy of the estimate
ψ(x). The interpretation of RBΨ(ψ |x) as the evidence for ψ, forces the use
of the sets CΨ,γ(x) for our credible regions. For if ψ1 is in such a region and
RBΨ(ψ2 |x) ≥ RBΨ(ψ1 |x), then ψ2 must be in the region as well as there
is at least as much evidence for ψ2 as for ψ1. Optimal properties for relative
belief credible regions, in the class of all credible regions, have been established
in Evans, Guttman and Swartz (2006) and Evans and Shakhatreh (2008) and
optimal properties for ψ(x) are established in Evans and Jang (2011c).
For the assessment of the hypothesis H0 : Ψ(θ) = ψ0, the evidence is given
by RBΨ(ψ0 |x). One problem that both the relative belief ratio and the Bayes
factor share as measures of evidence, is that it is not clear how they should be
calibrated. Certainly the bigger RBΨ(ψ0 |x) is than 1, the more evidence we
have in favor of ψ0 while the smaller RBΨ(ψ0 |x) is than 1, the more evidence we
have against ψ0. But what exactly does a value of RBΨ(ψ0 |x) = 20 mean? It
would appear to be strong evidence in favor of ψ0 because beliefs have increased
by a factor of 20 after seeing the data. But what if other values of ψ had even
larger increases? For example, the discussion in Baskurt and Evans (2013) of
the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox makes it clear that the value of a relative belief
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ratio or a Bayes factor cannot always be interpreted as an indication of the
strength of the evidence.
The value RBΨ(ψ0 |x) can be calibrated by comparing it to the other pos-
sible values RBΨ(· |x) through its posterior distribution. For example, one
possible measure of the strength is
ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x) (3)
which is the posterior probability that the true value of ψ has a relative belief
ratio no greater than that of the hypothesized value ψ0. While (3) may look
like a p-value, it has a very different interpretation. For when RBΨ(ψ0 |x) < 1,
so there is evidence against ψ0, then a small value for (3) indicates a large
posterior probability that the true value has a relative belief ratio greater than
RBΨ(ψ0 |x) and so there is strong evidence against ψ0. If RBΨ(ψ0 |x) > 1,
so there is evidence in favor of ψ0, then a large value for (3) indicates a small
posterior probability that the true value has a relative belief ratio greater than
RBΨ(ψ0 |x) and so there is strong evidence in favor of ψ0. Notice that, in the
set {ψ : RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x)}, the “best” estimate of the true value is
given by ψ0 simply because the evidence for this value is the largest in this set.
Various results have been established in Baskurt and Evans (2103) sup-
porting both RBΨ(ψ0 |x), as the measure of the evidence for H0, and (3), as
a measure of the strength of that evidence. For example, the following sim-
ple inequalities are useful in assessing the strength of the evidence, namely,
ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ |x) = RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x) ≤ ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x) ≤
RBΨ(ψ0 |x). So if RBΨ(ψ0 |x) > 1 and ΠΨ({RBΨ(ψ0 |x)} |x) is large, there is
strong evidence in favor of ψ0 while, if RBΨ(ψ0 |x) < 1 is very small, then there
is immediately strong evidence against ψ0. Also, in situations where there are
only a few possible values of ψ, then ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ |x) = RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x) can be
a more appropriate measure of strength.
When interest is in making inferences about ψ = Ψ(θ), it is reasonable to
ask how sensitive the relief belief approach is to the ingredients given by the
prior. This entails examining how dependent ψ(x), CΨ,γ(x), RBΨ(ψ0 |x) and
ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x) are to changes in the prior, as these four
objects represent the essential relative belief inferences.
The full prior π for θ can always be factored as π(θ) = πΨ(ψ)π(θ |ψ). In
contrast to other discussions of robustness with respect to the prior, the sensi-
tivity of the inferences to πΨ and the sensitivity of the inferences to π(· |ψ) are
considered separately, as this leads to more information concerning where the
lack of robustness arises when this occurs.
3 Optimal Robustness With Respect to the Marginal
Prior
The result (1) implies that RBΨ(ψ |x) = m(x |ψ)/m(x). From this it is imme-
diate that ψ(x) = arg supψ RBΨ(ψ |x) = arg supψm(x |ψ) and so the relative
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belief estimate is optimally robust to πΨ as the estimate has no dependence on
the marginal prior. Furthermore, CΨ,γ(x) is of the form {ψ : m(x |ψ) ≥ k} for
some k and so the form of relative belief regions for ψ is optimally robust to πΨ.
The specific region chosen for the assessment of the accuracy of ψ(x) depends
on the posterior and so is not independent of πΨ. It is now proved that CΨ,γ(x)
has an optimal robustness property among all credible regions for ψ.
Consider ǫ-contaminated priors for θ of the form
Πǫ = Π(· |ψ) × [(1− ǫ)ΠΨ + ǫQ], (4)
where Q is a probability measure on Ψ and Π is the base prior as described in
the Introduction. Note that the conditional prior of θ given Ψ(θ) = ψ is fixed
and independent of ǫ.
To assess the robustness of the posterior content of a set A ⊂ Ψ it makes
sense to look at δ(A) = ΠupperΨ (A |x) − Π
lower
Ψ (A |x) where Π
upper
Ψ (A |x) =
supQΠ
ǫ
Ψ (A |x) and Π
lower
Ψ (A |x) = infQΠ
ǫ
Ψ (A |x) and the supremum/infimum
is taken over all probability measures on Ψ. For this let ǫ∗ = ǫ/(1−ǫ) and r(A) =
supψ∈ARBΨ(ψ |x) = supψ∈Am(x |ψ)/m(x), so r(Ψ) = RBΨ(ψLRSE(x) |x)
and always one and only one of r(A), r(Ac) equals r(Ψ).
The following result is needed and a proof is provided in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 (Huber (1973)) Let Q denote a probability measure on Ψ. For prior
measure ΠǫΨ = (1−ǫ)ΠΨ+ǫQ on Ψ and A ⊂ Ψ, (i) Π
upper
Ψ (A |x) = (ΠΨ (A |x)+
ǫ∗r(A))/(1 + ǫ∗r(A)), (ii) ΠlowerΨ (A |x) = ΠΨ (A |x) /(1 + ǫ
∗r(Ac)), (iii)
δ(A) =
ΠΨ (A |x) ǫ
∗(r(Ac)− r(A))
(1 + ǫ∗r(A))(1 + ǫ∗r(Ac))
+
ǫ∗r(A)
(1 + ǫ∗r(A))
and (iv) δ(Ac) = δ(A).
Let γ∗(x) = ΠΨ (CΨ,γ(x) |x) be the exact posterior content of the γ-relative
belief region. The following result generalizes results found in Wasserman (1989)
and de la Horra and Fernandez (1994) who considered robustness to the prior
of credible regions for the full parameter θ. In particular, this result applies to
arbitrary parameters ψ = Ψ(θ) and does not require continuity.
Proposition 2 The following hold,
(i) among all sets A ⊂ Ψ satisfying ΠΨ (A |x) ≤ γ
∗(x) and r(A) = r(Ψ), the
set CΨ,γ(x) minimizes δ(A),
(ii) among all sets A ⊂ Ψ satisfying ΠΨ (A |x) ≥ γ
∗(x) and r(Ac) = r(Ψ), the
set CcΨ,1−γ∗(x)(x) minimizes δ(A),
(iii) when γ∗(x) = γ ≥ 1/2 then, among all sets A ⊂ Ψ satisfying ΠΨ (A |x) =
γ, the set CΨ,γ(x) minimizes δ(A).
Proof. (i) For any setA with r(A) = r(Ψ) then r(Ac)−r(A) = r(Ac)−r(Ψ) ≤ 0.
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Therefore,
δ(A) =
ΠΨ (A |x) ǫ
∗(r(Ac)− r(Ψ))
(1 + ǫ∗r(Ψ))(1 + ǫ∗r(Ac))
+
ǫ∗r(Ψ)
1 + ǫ∗r(Ψ)
≥
ΠΨ (CΨ,γ(x) |x) ǫ
∗(r(Ac)− r(Ψ))
(1 + ǫ∗r(Ψ))(1 + ǫ∗r(Ac))
+
ǫ∗r(Ψ)
1 + ǫ∗r(Ψ)
.
Now
r(Ac)− r(Ψ)
1 + ǫ∗r(Ac)
(5)
is increasing in r(Ac), so we need to show that A = CΨ,γ(x) minimizes r(A
c)
among all A satisfying ΠΨ (A |x) ≤ ΠΨ (CΨ,γ(x) |x) and r(A) = r(Ψ). Sup-
pose that r(Ac) < r(CcΨ,γ(x))and let B = {ψ : RBΨ(ψ |x) > r(A
c)}. Note
that r(CcΨ,γ(x)) ≤ infψ∈CΨ,γ(x)RBΨ(ψ |x) and so CΨ,γ(x) ⊂ B, which im-
plies ΠΨ (B |x) > ΠΨ (CΨ,γ(x) |x) with the strictness of the inequality fol-
lowing from the definition of CΨ,γ(x). But also B ⊂ A which contradicts
ΠΨ (A |x) ≤ ΠΨ (CΨ,γ(x) |x) and so we must have r(A
c) ≥ r(CcΨ,γ(x)). This
establishes that (5) is minimized by A = CΨ,γ(x).
(ii) Now consider all the sets A with r(Ac) = r(Ψ). Since δ(A) = δ(Ac),
it is equivalent to minimize δ(Ac) among all sets Ac satisfying ΠΨ (A
c |x) ≤
ΠΨ
(
CcΨ,γ(x) |x
)
= 1 − γ∗(x) and r(Ac) = r(Ψ). By part (i) this is minimized
by taking Ac = CΨ,1−γ∗(x)(x) and the result is proved.
(iii) The solutions to the optimization problems in parts (i) and (ii), namely,
CΨ,γ(x) and C
c
Ψ,1−γ(x) respectively, both have posterior content equal to γ. As
such one of these sets is the solution to the optimization problem stated in (iii).
We have that
δ(CΨ,γ(x)) − δ(C
c
Ψ,1−γ(x)) = δ(CΨ,γ(x)) − δ(CΨ,1−γ(x))
=
γǫ∗(r(CcΨ,γ(x)) − r(Ψ))
(1 + ǫ∗r(Ψ))(1 + ǫr(CcΨ,γ(x)))
−
γǫ∗(r(CcΨ,1−γ(x)) − r(Ψ))
(1 + ǫ∗r(Ψ))(1 + ǫr(CcΨ,1−γ(x)))
=
γǫ∗
(1 + ǫ∗r(Ψ))
{
r(CcΨ,γ(x)) − r(Ψ)
1 + ǫr(CcΨ,γ(x))
−
r(CcΨ,1−γ(x)) − r(Ψ)
1 + ǫr(CcΨ,1−γ(x))
}
.
The result follows from this because CcΨ,γ(x) ⊂ C
c
Ψ,1−γ(x), so r(C
c
Ψ,γ(x)) ≤
r(CcΨ,1−γ(x)), and (5) is increasing in r(A
c).
It is interesting to consider the statistical meaning of the separate parts of
Proposition 2 as the statements create a degree of ambiguity. If a system of
credible regions is being used, say BΨ,γ(x), then it makes sense to require that
these sets are monotonically increasing in γ and the smallest set limγց0BΨ,γ(x)
contains a single point which is taken as the estimate of ψ. The size of BΨ,γ(x),
for some specific γ, can then be taken as an assessment of the accuracy of the
estimate where size is measured in some application dependent way. The relative
belief regions satisfy this and the estimate, under the assumption of a unique
maximizer of RBΨ(· |x), is ψ(x). So effectively (i) is saying that CΨ,γ(x) is the
most robust system of credible regions with respect to posterior content. Note
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that we have to exclude sets A with ΠΨ (A |x) > γ
∗(x) because, for example,
the set A = Ψ is always optimally robust with respect to content but does not
provide a meaningful assessment of the accuracy of the estimate. Given that
ψ(x) and the form of CΨ,γ(x) are optimally robust, this further supports the
claim that relative belief estimation is optimally robust to the choice of the
marginal prior. Note that the sets in (ii) do not satisfy the stated criteria for
being a system of credible regions.
Part (iii) indicates that, when there are many sets with posterior content
exactly equal to γ, and this is typically true in the continuous case, then CΨ,γ(x)
is optimally robust among these sets with respect to content. It makes sense
to require γ∗(x) ≥ 1/2 for any credible region as, if γ∗(x) < 1/2, then there is
more belief that the true value is in CcΨ,γ(x) than in CΨ,γ(x).
Applying Lemma 1 gives
δ(CΨ,γ(x)) =
ǫ∗RBΨ(ψ(x)πx)
(1 + ǫ∗RBΨ(ψ(x) |x))
×{
1−
ΠΨ (CΨ,γ(x) |x)
RBΨ(ψ(x) |x)
1− infψ∈CΨ,γ(x)RBΨ(ψ |x)
(1 + ǫ∗ infψ∈CΨ,γ(x)RBΨ(ψ |x))
}
and this can be close to 1 when RBΨ(ψ(x) |x) is large. So, while CΨ,γ(x)
possesses an optimal robustness property with respect to posterior content, this
does not imply that the posterior content is necessarily robust. This depends
on other aspects of the particular problem which will be discussed.
4 Measuring Robustness Quantitatively
To measure the robustness of an inference to the prior π, when using the ǫ-
contaminated class, it is natural to look at Gaˆteaux derivatives of the relevant
quantity at π in various directions Q. The derivative is a measure of the sen-
sitivity of the inference to small changes in the prior and so is local in nature.
When the derivative is large for some Q, the inference is highly sensitive to the
prior chosen and naturally this is viewed negatively. In this section this behav-
ior of relative belief inferences is analyzed separately for ǫ-contaminated classes
for the marginal πΨ and the conditional π(· |ψ).
4.1 Sensitivity to the Marginal Prior
Consider the family of priors given by (4) but now restricted to those Q that are
also absolutely continuous with respect to νΨ on Ψ and let q denote the density
of Q. The posterior of ψ based on the contaminated prior is Πǫ,Ψ(· |x) = (1 −
ǫx)ΠΨ(· |x) + ǫxQ(· |x) where ǫx = ǫmQ (x) /[(1− ǫ)m(x) + ǫmQ (x)],mQ(x) =∫
Ψm(x |ψ)Q(dψ) and Q(A |x) =
∫
A(m(x |ψ)/mQ(x))Q(dψ). The relative be-
lief ratio for ψ based on a general Πǫ equals RBǫ,Ψ(ψ |x) = (1−ǫx)RBΨ(ψ |x)+
ǫxRBQ,Ψ(ψ |x) and here, using (1), RBQ,Ψ(ψ |x) = m(x |ψ)/mQ (x) so
RBǫ,Ψ(ψ |x) =
RBΨ(ψ |x)
1− ǫ(1−mQ (x) /m(x))
. (6)
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The following result gives the Gaˆteaux derivative of the relative belief ratio.
Proposition 3 The Gaˆteaux derivative of RBΨ(· |x) at ψ in the direction Q
equals
RBΨ(ψ |x) {1−mQ (x) /m (x)} . (7)
Proof. From (6),
lim
ǫ→0
RBǫΨ(ψ |x)−RBΨ(ψ |x)
ǫ
= RBΨ(ψ |x) lim
ǫ→0
{
(1−mQ (x) /m(x))
1− ǫ(1−mQ (x) /m(x))
}
.
The value of (7) can be large simply because RBΨ(ψ |x) is large, so it makes
more sense to look at the relative change as given by 1−mQ (x) /m (x) . There-
fore, for small ǫ,
|RBǫ,Ψ(ψ |x)−RBΨ(ψ |x)|
RBΨ(ψ |x)
≈
∣∣∣∣1− mQ(x)m(x)
∣∣∣∣ ǫ
implying a small relative change in RBΨ(ψ |x) when mQ(x)/m(x) is not large.
The Gaˆteaux derivative of the strength of the evidence is now computed.
Proposition 4 The Gaˆteaux derivative of ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x)
at ψ0 in the direction Q is
mQ (x)
m(x)
{
Q(RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x)−
ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x)
}
.
Proof. The strength based on ΠǫΨ satisfies Π
ǫ
Ψ(RBǫ,Ψ(ψ |x) ≤ RBǫ,Ψ(ψ0 |x) |x)
= (1− ǫx)ΠΨ(RBǫ,Ψ(ψ |x) ≤ RBǫ,Ψ(ψ0 |x) |x)+ǫxQ(RBǫ,Ψ(ψ |x) ≤ RBǫ,Ψ(ψ0
|x) |x). So, using (6),
ΠǫΨ(RBǫ,Ψ(ψ |x) ≤ RBǫ,Ψ(ψ0 |x) |x) = ΠΨ(m(x |ψ) ≤ m(x |ψ0) |x)+
ǫx {Q(m(x |ψ) ≤ m(x |ψ0) |x)−ΠΨ(m(x |ψ) ≤ m(x |ψ0) |x)} .
This implies that
lim
ǫ→0
[ΠǫΨ(RB
ǫ
Ψ(ψ0 |x) ≤ RB
ǫ
Ψ(ψ0 |x) |x) −ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x)]/ǫ
=
mQ (x)
m(x)
{Q(m(x |ψ) ≤ m(x |ψ0) |x)−ΠΨ(m(x |ψ) ≤ m(x |ψ0) |x)}
=
mQ (x)
m(x)
{
Q(RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x)−
ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x)
}
.
So the strength is robust to choice of the marginal prior πΨ whenevermQ(x)/m(x)
is small.
For both the measure of evidence RBΨ(ψ0 |x) and its strength, the ratio
mQ(x)/m(x) plays a key role in determining the robustness. The implications
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of this are discussed in Section 5. Note that supQmQ(x)/m(x) = RB(ψ(x) |x)
gives the worst case behavior of this ratio.
It is of interest to contrast these results with those for the commonly used
MAP inferences which are based on the posterior density πΨ (· |x) .
Proposition 5 The Gaˆteaux derivative of the posterior density of ψ in the
direction Q at ψ0 is given by {mQ(x)/m(x)}{q (ψ0 |x)− πΨ (ψ0 |x)}.
Proof. Since πǫ,Ψ (ψ |x) = (1− ǫx)πΨ(ψ |x) + ǫxq(ψ|x) it follows that
lim
ǫ→0
πǫ,Ψ (ψ0 |x)− πΨ (ψ0 |x)
ǫ
=
mQ (x)
m(x)
(q (ψ0 |x)− πΨ (ψ0 |x)).
Note that MAP-based inferences implicitly use πΨ (ψ0 |x) as a measure of the
evidence that ψ0 is the true value. Comparing this with the relative belief ratio
we see that for small ǫ,
|πǫ,Ψ (ψ0 |x)− πΨ(ψ0 |x)|
πΨ(ψ0 |x)
≈
mQ(x)
m(x)
∣∣∣∣1− q (ψ0 |x)πΨ (ψ0 |x)
∣∣∣∣ ǫ
and the relative change in πΨ (ψ0 |x) is dependent on the ratio of the posteriors
as well asmQ(x)/m(x). So if πΨ (ψ0 |x) is small relative to q (ψ0 |x) we will get a
big relative change and this suggests that MAP inferences are much less robust
than relative belief inferences. A similar result is obtained for the Bayesian
p-value in Evans and Zou (2001).
4.2 Sensitivity to the Conditional Prior
Consider now priors for θ of the form Πǫ = [(1−ǫ)Π(· |ψ)+ǫQ(· |ψ)]×ΠΨ where
Q(· |ψ) is a probability measure on Ψ−1{ψ} absolutely continuous with respect
to νΨ−1{ψ} with density q(· |ψ), for each ψ ∈ Ψ. So the marginal prior of ψ is
now fixed and the conditional prior of θ is perturbed. The posterior of ψ based
on this prior is Πǫ,Ψ (· |x) = (1− ǫx)ΠΨ (· |x) + ǫxQΨ (· |x) where QΨ (A |x) =∫
A
(mQ(x |ψ)/mQ(x))ΠΨ(dψ),mQ(x |ψ) =
∫
Ψ−1{ψ}
fθ(x)Q(dθ |ψ) andmQ(x) =∫
Ψ
mQ(x |ψ)ΠΨ(dψ).
The relative belief ratio for ψ based on Πǫ equals RBǫ,Ψ(ψ |x) = (1 −
ǫx)RBΨ(ψ |x) + ǫxRBQ,Ψ(ψ |x) where now BQ,Ψ(ψ0 |x) = mQ(x |ψ0)/mQ(x).
This leads to the following result.
Proposition 6 The Gaˆteaux derivative of RBΨ(· |x) at ψ0 in the direction Q
is {mQ(x)/m (x)}(RBQ,Ψ(ψ0 |x)−RBΨ(ψ0 |x)).
Proof. Clearly,
lim
ǫ→0
RBǫ,Ψ(ψ0 |x)−RBΨ(ψ0 |x)
ǫ
=
mQ (x)
m(x)
(RBQ,Ψ(ψ0 |x)−RBΨ(ψ0 |x)).
The implications of this result for robustness are discussed in Section 5.
Now consider the robustness of the strength of the evidence.
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Proposition 7 If RBΨ(· |x) has a discrete distribution with support containing
no limit points, the Gaˆteaux derivative of ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x) at
ψ0 in the direction Q equals 0. When RBΨ(· |x) has a continuous distribution
under ΠΨ(· |x) with density g(· |x), the Gaˆteaux derivative of ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤
RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x) at ψ0 in the direction Q equals
{mQ(x)/m (x))}RBQ,Ψ(ψ0 |x)g(RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x).
Proof. Since
ΠΨ(RBǫ,Ψ(ψ |x) ≤ RBǫ,Ψ(ψ0 |x) |x)
= ΠΨ
(
(1− ǫx)RBΨ(ψ |x) + ǫxRBQ,Ψ(ψ |x)
≤ (1− ǫx)RBΨ(ψ0 |x) + ǫxRBQ,Ψ(ψ0 |x)
|x
)
,
then, for all ǫ > 0 such that ǫx ≤ 1,
ΠΨ(RBǫ,Ψ(ψ |x) ≤ RBǫ,Ψ(ψ0 |x) |x)
≤ ΠΨ
(
RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x) +
ǫx
1− ǫx
RBQ,Ψ(ψ0 |x) |x
)
and for all ǫ < 0,
ΠΨ(RBǫ,Ψ(ψ |x) ≤ RBǫ,Ψ(ψ0 |x) |x)
≥ ΠΨ
(
RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x) +
ǫx
1− ǫx
RBQ,Ψ(ψ0 |x) |x
)
.
When RBΨ(· |x) has a discrete distribution with support containing no limit
points, then the lower and upper bounds equal ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x)
for all ǫ small enough and the result follows. When RBΨ(· |x) has a continuous
distribution with density g(· |x), then
lim
ǫ→0
ΠΨ(RBǫ,Ψ(ψ0 |x) ≤ RBǫ,Ψ(ψ0 |x) |x)−ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x)
ǫ
= {mQ (x) /m(x)}RBQ,Ψ(ψ0 |x)g(RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x).
From this it is seen that in the discrete case the strength is insensitive to local
changes in the prior.
Consider the continuous case. When there is strong evidence either for or
against ψ0, then RBΨ(ψ0 |x) will be in the right or left tail correspondingly of
the posterior distribution of RBΨ(· |x) and so g(RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x) will tend to be
small. As such the strength will be robust to small changes in the prior pro-
vided mQ (x) /m(x) is not large. When there is not strong evidence however,
then g(RBΨ(ψ0 |x) |x) could be large and, if mQ (x) /m(x) is not small, then
the strength is not robust. This underscores a recommendation in Baskurt and
Evans (2013) that in the continuous case the parameter be discretized when
assessing the evidence and its strength. For this, when ψ is real-valued, let
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δ > 0 be the difference between two ψ values that is deemed to be of practical
importance. The prior and posterior distributions of ψ discretized to the inter-
vals [ψ0 + (2i − 1)δ/2, ψ0 + (2i + 1)δ/2) for i ∈ Z are then used to assess the
hypothesis corresponds to the interval [ψ0 − δ/2, ψ0 + δ/2). By Proposition 7
the strength is then insensitive to small changes in the prior.
It is perhaps not surprising that the robustness behavior of the relative
belief ratio and its strength is more complicated when considering the effect
of the conditional prior than with the marginal prior. The optimality results
concerning robustness to the marginal prior underscore this.
5 Robustness and Prior-Data Conflict
The existence of a prior-data conflict means that the data support certain val-
ues of ψ = Ψ(θ) being the true value but the prior places little or no mass
there. While various measures can be used to determine whether or not such
a conflict has occurred, a logical approach is based on the factorization of the
joint probability measure for (θ, x) given by Π× Pθ = Π(· |T )×MT × P (· |T ),
where T is a minimal sufficient statistic, Π(· |T ) is the posterior probability
measure for θ, MT is the prior predictive probability measure of T and P (· |T )
is the conditional probability measure of the data given T. The measure P (· |T )
is then available for computing probabilities relevant to checking the model
{fθ : θ ∈ Θ}, the measure MT is available for computing probabilities relevant
to checking the prior and Π(· |T ) is the relevant probability measure for com-
puting probabilities for θ. A statistical analysis then proceeds by checking the
model, perhaps via a tail probability based on a discrepancy statistic, and then
proceeding to check the prior if the data does not contradict the model. If both
the model and prior are not contradicted by the data, then we can proceed to
inference about θ. The logic behind this sequence lies in part with the fact that
it makes no sense to check a prior if the model fails. Furthermore, separating
the check of the prior from that of the model provides more information in the
event of a conflict arising, as it is then possible to identify where the failure lies,
namely, with the model or with the prior.
In Evans and Moshonov (2006) this factorization was adhered to and the
tail probability
MT (mT (t) ≤ mT (T (x))) (8)
was advocated for checking the prior wheremT is the density ofMT with respect
to some support measure. So if (8) is small, then the observed value T (x) of the
minimal sufficient statistic lies in the tails of MT and there is an indication of
a prior-data conflict. In Evans and Jang (2011a) the validity of this approach
was firmly established by the proof that (8) converges to Π(π(θ) ≤ π(θtrue))
under i.i.d. sampling and some additional weak conditions. Furthermore, it was
shown how to modify (8) so as to achieve invariance under choice of the minimal
sufficient statistic. Also, Evans and Moshonov (2006) argued that (8) should be
replaced by MT (mT (t) ≤ mT (T (x)) |U(T (x))) for any maximal ancillary U(T )
as the variation in T due to to U(T ) has nothing to do with θ and so reflects
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nothing about the prior. The tail probability (8) is a check on the full prior and
Evans and Moshonov (2006) also developed methods for checking factors of the
prior so a failure in the prior could be isolated to a particular aspect.
First, however, consider the case when Ψ(θ) = θ and interest is in the robust-
ness of inferences to the whole prior. From the results in Section 4.1, it is seen
that the ratio mQ(x)/m(x) = mQ,T (T (x))/mT (T (x)), where mQ,T (T (x)) =∫
Θ fθ,T (T (x))Q(dθ), plays a key role in determining the local sensitivity in the
direction given by Q, of the inferences for given observed data x. This depends
on Q and the worst case is given by
sup
Q
mQ,T (T (x))
mT (T (x))
= sup
Q
∫
Θ
fθ,T (T (x))Q(dθ)
mT (T (x))
= RB(θ(x) |x) (9)
and note that θ(x) is the MLE in this case as well as the relative belief estimate.
Notice that when (8) is small, so there is an indication of a prior-data conflict
existing, then mT (T (x)) is relatively small when compared to other values of
mT (t) which are not influenced by the data. This implies that the prior is having
a big influence relative to the data and so a lack of robustness can be expected.
This phenomenon is well-illustrated in the following examples where ancil-
laries play no role because of Basu’s theorem.
Example 1. Location normal model.
Suppose that x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a sample from the N(µ, 1) distribution with
µ ∼ N(µ0, σ
2
0). Then MT is given by T (x) = x¯ ∼ N(µ0, 1/n+ σ
2
0). When Q is
the N(µ1, σ
2
1) distribution, then MQ,T is given by x¯ ∼ N(µ1, 1/n + σ
2
1). This
implies that
mQ,T (T (x))
mT (T (x))
=
√
1/n+ σ20
1/n+ σ21
exp
{
−
1
2
[ (
1/n+ σ21
)−1
(x¯− µ1)
2
−(
1/n+ σ20
)−1
(x¯− µ0)
2
]}
(10)
and, as a function of (µ1, σ
2
1) this is maximized when µ1 = x¯, σ
2
1 = 0. Notice
that this supremum converges to ∞ as x¯→ ±∞ and such values correspond to
prior-data conflict with respect to the N(µ0, σ
2
0) prior.
Now, consider a numerical example. A sample of size n = 20 was generated
from the N(0, 1) distribution obtaining x¯ = 0.2591. When the base prior is
N(0.5, 1) then (8) equals 0.8141 and accordingly there is no indication of any
prior-data conflict. Also, supQ (mQ(x)/m(x)) = 4.7109 which seems modest
as it describes the worst case robustness behavior. In Table 1 some values of
mQ(x)/m(x) are recorded when Q is a N(µ1, σ
2
1) distribution for various values
of µ1 and σ
2
1 as these might be expected to be realistic directions in which to
perturb the base prior. In all cases the value of mQ(x)/m(x) is quite modest
and the maximum value of (10) is 1.0534. Overall it can be concluded here that
the analysis is robust to local perturbations of the prior.
Now consider an example where there is prior-data conflict. In this case a
sample of n = 20 is generated from a N(4, 1) distribution obtaining x¯ = 4.0867
and the same base prior is used. The value of (8) is 0.0005 and so there is
a strong indication of prior-data conflict. Furthermore, supQ (mQ(x)/m(x)) =
12
µ1 σ
2
1 mQ(x)/m(x) µ1 σ
2
1 mQ(x)/m(x)
−3.0 1 0.0065 0.5 0.5 1.3474
−2.0 1 0.0905 0.5 1.0 1.0000
−1.0 1 0.4832 0.5 2.0 0.7254
1.0 1 0.7917 0.5 3.0 0.5975
2.0 1 0.2428 0.5 50.0 0.1488
3.0 1 0.0287 0.5 100.0 0.1053
Table 1: The ratio mQ(x)/m(x) in Example 1 when there is no conflict.
µ1 σ
2
1 mQ(x)/m(x) µ1 σ
2
1 mQ(x)/m(x)
−3.0 1 1.88× 10−8 0.5 0.5 0.0053
−2.0 1 9.97× 10−8 0.5 1.0 1.0000
−1.0 1 2.00× 10−4 0.5 2.0 14.2070
1.0 1 4.90× 10−1 0.5 3.0 32.5842
2.0 1 5.75× 101 0.5 50.0 58.2823
3.0 1 2.61× 102 0.5 100.0 43.9565
Table 2: The ratio mQ(x)/m(x) in Example 1 when there is conflict.
2096.85 which certainly indicates a lack of robustness. In Table 2 some values
of mQ(x)/m(x) are recorded when Q is a N(µ1, σ
2
1) distribution for various
values of µ1 and σ
2
1 . It is seen that the value of mQ(x)/m(x) can be relatively
large and the maximum value of (10) is 468.86. So it can be concluded that the
analysis based on the model, prior and observed data, will not be robust to local
perturbations of the prior when there is prior-data conflict. 
Example 2. Bernoulli model.
Suppose that x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a sample from a Bernoulli(θ) and the prior
is θ ∼ beta(α0, β0) for some choice of (α0, β0). A minimal sufficient statistic is
T (x) =
∑n
i=1 xi ∼ Binomial(n, θ) and then
mT (t) =
(
n
t
)
Γ(α0 + β0)
Γ(α0)Γ(β0)
Γ(t+ α0)Γ(n− t+ β0)
Γ(n+ α0 + β0)
.
Also,
sup
Q
(mQ(x)/m(x)) =
Γ(α0)Γ(β0)
Γ(α0 + β0)
Γ(n+ α0 + β0)
Γ(t+ α0)Γ(n− t+ β0)
x¯nx¯(1− x¯)n(1−x¯).
To illustrate the relationship between prior-data conflict and robustness,
consider a numerical example. Suppose that α0 = 5 and β0 = 20. Generating
a sample of size n = 20 from the Bernoulli(0.25) gave the value nx¯ = 3. In
this case (8) equals 0.7100 and there is no indication of any prior-data conflict.
Also, supQ (mQ(x)/m(x)) = 1.4211 which indicates that the inferences will be
generally robust to small deviations. If mQ(x)/m(x) is computed for various Q,
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α1 β1 mQ(x)/m(x) α1 β1 mQ(x)/m(x)
20 5 32647.89 5 1 21523.28
15 5 25729.50 5 25 0.12
10 5 15010.95 5 22 0.41
5 5 3996.37 5 20 1.00
1 5 125.87 5 16 6.77
Table 3: The ratio mQ(x)/m(x) in Example 2 when there is conflict.
where Q is a beta(α1, β1), then in all cases it is readily seen that this ratio is
quite reasonable in value as indeed it is bounded above by 1.4211.
A sample of n = 20 was also generated from a Bernoulli(0.9) with the same
prior being used. In this case nx¯ = 17 and (8) equals 6.2 × 10−6, so there is a
strong indication of prior-data conflict. Also, supQ (mQ(x)/m(x)) = 46396.43
which indicates that the inferences will be generally not be robust to small
deviations. Table 3 provides some values of mQ(x)/m(x) for Q given by a
beta(α1, β1) for various choices of (α1, β1) and there are several large values. 
Now consider the case when θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ1 × Θ2 so the prior factors
as π(θ) = π2(θ2 | θ1)π1(θ1). Presumably the conditional prior π2(· | θ1) and the
marginal prior π1 are elicited and the goal is inference about some ψ = Ψ(θ).
It is then preferable to check the prior by checking each individual component
for prior-data conflict as this leads to more information about where a conflict
exists when it does.
In general, it is not clear how to check the individual components but in
certain contexts a particular structure holds that allows for this. Suppose that
all ancillaries are independent of the minimal sufficient statistic and so can be
ignored. The more general situation is covered in Evans and Moshonov (2006).
As discussed in Evans and Moshonov (2006), suppose there is a statistic
V (T ) such that the marginal distribution of V (T ) is dependent only on θ1. Such
a statistic is referred to as being ancillary for θ2 given θ1. Naturally we want
V (T ) to be a maximal ancillary for θ2 given θ1. An appropriate tail probability
for checking π1 is then given by
MV (T )(mV (T )(v) ≤ mV (T )(V (T (x)))), (11)
as MV (T ) does not depend on π2(· | θ1). A natural order is to check π1 first and
then check π2(· | θ1) for prior-data conflict, whenever no prior-data conflict is
found for π1. The appropriate tail probability for checking π2(· | θ1) is given by
MT (mT (t |V (T (x))) ≤ mT (T (x) |V (T (x))) |V (T (x))). (12)
Note that this is assessing whether or not π2(· | θ1) is a suitable prior for θ2
among those θ1 values deemed to be suitable according to the prior π1. If (12)
were to be used before (11), then it would not be possible to assess if a failure
was due to where π1 was placing the bulk of its mass or was caused by where
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the conditional priors were placing their mass. Notice that
mQ,T (T (x))
mT (T (x))
=
mQ,T (T (x) |V (T (x)))
mT (T (x) |V (T (x)))
mQ,V (T )(V (T (x)))
mV (T )(V (T (x)))
, (13)
so prior-data conflict with either π1 or π2(· | θ1) could lead to large values of the
ratio on the left for certain choices of Q. When only the conditional prior of θ2
given θ1 is perturbed, then mQ,V (T )(V (T (x))) = mV (T )(V (T (x))).
Letting fθ1,V denote the density of V, then
mQ,V (T )(V (T (x)))
mV (T )(V (T (x)))
=
∫
Θ1
fθ1,V (V (T (x)))
mV (T )(V (T (x)))
Q1(dθ1) ≤ RB1(θ1(V (T (x))) |V (T (x)))
where RB1(· |V (T (x))) gives the relative belief ratios for θ1 based on having
observed V (T (x)). The right-hand side gives the worst-case behavior of the
second factor in (13).
Now consider the robustness of relative belief inferences for a general ψ =
Ψ(θ). The following result generalizes Propositions 3 and 6 as we consider a
general perturbation to the prior, namely, Πǫ = (1− ǫ)Π + ǫQ and the proof is
the same as that of Proposition 6.
Proposition 8 The Gaˆteaux derivative of RBΨ(· |x) at ψ in the direction Q is
{mQ(x)/m (x)}(RBQ,Ψ(ψ |x)−RBΨ(ψ |x)).
The factor RBQ,Ψ(ψ |x) − RBΨ(ψ |x) can be big simply because we choose
a prior Q that is very different than Π. For example, RBΨ(ψ |x) may be big
(small) because there is considerable evidence in favor of (against) ψ being the
true value and we can choose a prior Q that doesn’t (does) place mass near ψ.
As such, it makes sense to standardize the derivative by dividing by this factor
and this leaves the robustness determined again by mQ(x)/m (x) .
Suppose now that Q and Π have the same marginal for ς = Ξ(θ). Then,
mQ(x) = m (x)
∫
Ξ
∫
Ξ−1{τ}
RB(θ |x)Q(dθ |ψ)ΠΞ(dς) ≤ m (x)
∫
Ξ
RB(θς(x) |x)
ΠΞ(dς) where θς(x) = arg sup{RB(θ) |x) : Ξ(θ) = ς}. Therefore,
mQ(x)
m (x)
≤
∫
Ξ
RB(θς(x) |x)ΠΞ(dς) (14)
and the the right-hand side gives the worst-case behavior of the first factor in
(13) when Ξ(θ) = θ1 which is related to prior-data conflict with the prior on θ2.
The following is a standard example where priors are specified hierarchically.
Example 3 Location-scale normal model.
Suppose that x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a sample from the N(µ, σ
2) distribution
with µ |σ2 ∼ N(µ0, τ
2
0σ
2), σ−2 ∼ gammarate(α0, β0). Then T (x) = (x¯, ||x −
x¯1||2) is a minimal sufficient statistic for the model. Note that the prior is chosen
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by eliciting values for µ0, τ
2
0 , α0, β0 and so there is interest in how sensitive infer-
ences are to perturbations in each component separately. The posterior distri-
bution of (µ, σ2) is given by µ |σ2, T (x) ∼ N(µx,
(
n+ 1/τ20
)−1
σ2), σ−2 |T (x) ∼
gammarate
(
α0 + n/2, β(x¯, s
2)
)
where µx = (n+1/τ
2
0 )
−1(nx¯+µ0/τ
2
0 ) and β(x¯, s
2)
= β0 + (n− 1)s
2/2 + n(x¯− µ0)
2/2(nτ20 + 1) with s
2 = ||x− x¯1||2/(n− 1).
Consider first inferences for ψ = Ψ(θ) = σ2 and note that V (T (x)) = ||x −
x¯1||2 is ancillary given ψ and its distribution depends on ψ. Therefore, the prior
on σ2 is checked first using the prior predictive for V (T (x)). An easy calculation
gives that the prior distribution of s2 = V (T (x))/(n−1) is (β0/α0)F (n−1, 2α0)
and this specifies (11). While the results of Section 4.1 apply here, consider
the behavior of the relative belief ratio RB1(σ
2 |V (T (x))) which is based on
only observing V (T (x)) rather than T (x). By Proposition 3 this has Gaˆteaux
derivative depending on mQ,V (T )(V (T (x)))/mV (T )(V (T (x))). Notice, however,
that relative belief ratios accumulate evidence in a simple way. For any statistic
V (T (x)), then
RBΨ(ψ |T (x)) =
πΨ(ψ |T (x))
πΨ(ψ)
=
πΨ(ψ |V (T (x)))
πΨ(ψ)
πΨ(ψ |T (x))
πΨ(ψ |V (T (x)))
where the first factor gives the evidence obtained after observing V (T (x)) and
the second factor gives the evidence obtained after observing T (x) having al-
ready observed V (T (x)). So RB1(σ
2 |x) = RB1(σ
2 |V (T (x)))[RB1(σ
2 |T (x))/
RB1(σ
2 |V (T (x)))] with the same interpretation for the factors. As such, a
lack of robustness of RB1(σ
2 |V (T (x))), which can be connected to prior-data
conflict through (11), implies a lack of robustness for RB1(σ
2 |x).
When no prior-data conflict is obtained for the prior on σ2, then it makes
sense to look for prior-data conflict with the prior on µ which is typically the
parameter of primary interest. So now consider perturbations to the prior
on µ and the relationship to prior-data conflict with this prior. The con-
ditional distribution of T (x) given V (T (x)) is given by the conditional prior
predictive of x¯ given s2 which is distributed as µ0 + σ˜tn+2α0−1 where σ˜
2 ={
τ20
(
nτ20 + 1
) (
2β0 + (n− 1)s
2
)
+ 1
}
/{nτ20 (n+ 2α0 − 1)} specifying (12). Fur-
thermore, for (14), Ξ(θ) = σ2 and θσ2 (x) = (x¯, σ
2) with
RB((x¯, σ2) |x)
=
(nτ20 + 1)
1
2
βα00
Γ(α0)
Γ(α0 + n/2)
(β(x¯, s2))α0+
n
2
(
1
σ2
)n
2
exp
{
−
(n− 1)s2
2σ2
}
and so∫ ∞
0
RB((x¯, σ2) |x)Π1(dσ
−2) = (nτ20 + 1)
1
2
(
β(x¯, s2)
β0 + (n− 1)s2/2
)α0+n2
.
Now consider a number of numerical examples where the base prior is always
specified by µ0 = 0, τ
2
0 = 1, α0 = 5 and β0 = 5. The behavior of the two factors
in (13) is examined when there is no prior-data conflict and when there is.
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α1 β1
mQ,V (T )(V (T (x)))
mV (T )(V (T (x)))
α1 β1
mQ,V (T )(V (T (x)))
mV (T )(V (T (x)))
5 1 0.05 1 5 0.07
5 2 0.38 2 5 0.25
5 4 0.99 4 5 0.81
5 10 0.34 10 5 0.53
Table 4: The ratio mQ,V (T )(V (T (x)))/mV (T )(V (T (x))) in Example 3 when
there is no conflict with the prior on σ2.
α1 β1
mQ,V (T )(V (T (x)))
mV (T )(V (T (x)))
α1 β1
mQ,V (T )(V (T (x)))
mV (T )(V (T (x)))
5 1 0.00 1 5 5517.42
5 2 0.01 2 5 1245.26
5 4 2.34 4 5 13.78
5 10 23.51 10 5 0.00
Table 5: The ratio mQ,V (T )(V (T (x)))/mV (T )(V (T (x))) in Example 3 when
there is conflict with the prior on σ2.
A sample of size n = 20 was generated from the N(0, 1) distribution obtain-
ing x¯ = −0.1066, s2 = 0.9087. So there should be no prior-data conflict with the
prior on σ2. Indeed, (11) equals 0.7626 so there is no indication of any problems
with the prior on σ2. Values ofmQ,V (T )(V (T (x)))/mV (T )(V (T (x))) are recorded
in Table 4 when the marginal prior on σ2 is perturbed by a gammarate(α1, β1)
distribution for various values of α1 and β1. In all cases, the ratio is small
and indicates robustness to local perturbations of the prior on σ2. Note that
the worst case behavior, over all possible directions, is given by the maximized
relative belief ratio for σ2 based on V (T (x)) which occurs at σ2 = s2 and equals
RB1(s
2 |V (T (x)))
=
Γ(α0)
Γ(α0 + (n− 1)/2)
β−α00 e
−n−12 (s2)−
n−1
2
(
(n− 1)s2
2
+ β0
)n−1
2 +α0
.
In this case RB1(s
2 |V (T (x))) = 1.7479.
Next a sample of size n = 20 from the N(0, 25) was generated obtaining
x¯ = 0.0950, s2 = 23.9593. So there is clearly prior-data conflict with the prior
on σ2. This is reflected in the value of (11) which equals 0.64 × 10−5. Table
5 shows that there is a serious lack of robustness. The worst case behavior is
given by RB1(s
2 |V (T (x))) = 40484.68.
It is also relevant to consider what happens concerning the robustness of
inferences about σ2 when there is prior-data conflict with the prior on µ but
not with the prior on σ2. A sample of n = 20 was generated from the N(10, 1)
distribution obtaining x¯ = 9.7041, s2 = 1.0082, so there is clearly prior-data
conflict with the prior on µ but not with the prior on σ2. The value of (11)
equals 0.6460 which gives no reason to doubt the relevance of the prior on σ2.
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α1 β1
mQ,V (T )(V (T (x))
mV (T )(V (T (x))
α1 β1
mQ,V (T )(V (T (x))
mV (T )(V (T (x))
5 1 0.03 1 5 0.09
5 2 0.29 2 5 0.31
5 4 0.92 4 5 0.86
5 10 0.44 10 5 0.38
Table 6: The ratio mQ,V (T )(V (T (x)))/mV (T )(V (T (x))) in Example 3 when
there is conflict with the prior on µ but not with the prior on σ2.
µ1 τ
2
1
mQ,T (T (x) |V (T (x)))
mT (T (x) |V (T (x)))
µ1 τ
2
1
mQ,T (T (x) |V (T (x)))
mT (T (x) |V (T (x)))
−2 1 0.17 0 2 0.51
−1 1 0.66 0 3 0.34
1 1 0.54 0 4 0.26
2 1 0.12 0 5 0.21
Table 7: The ratio mQ,T (T (x) |V (T (x))))/mT (T (x) |V (T (x))) in Example 3
when there is no conflict with the prior on σ2 or with the prior on µ.
Table 6 shows that mQ,V (T )(V (T (x)))/mV (T )((T (x))) is small and indicates
robustness to local perturbations of the prior on σ2. The worst case behavior
is given by RB1(s
2 |V (T (x))) = 1.7218. This reinforces the claim that the tail
probabilities (11) and (12) are measuring different aspects of the data conflicting
with the prior.
Now consider perturbations to the prior on µ with the prior on σ2 fixed. A
sample of n = 20 was generated from a N(0, 1) obtaining x¯ = −0.1066, s2 =
0.9087 so there is clearly no prior-data conflict with either component. This
is reflected in the value of (12) which equals 0.9150. Table 7 shows that the
first factor mQ,T (T (x) |V (T (x)))/mT (T (x) |V (T (x))) in (13) is small when the
conditional prior on µ is perturbed by N(µ1, τ
2
1 ) priors and thus demonstrates
robustness to perturbations in these directions. The worst case behavior is given
by
∫∞
0 RB((x¯, σ
2) |x)Π1(dσ
−2) = 4.6099 which is comparatively small.
Table 8 gives some values ofmQ,T (T (x) |V (T (x)))/mT (T (x) |V (T (x))) when
a sample of n = 20 was generated from a N(0, 25), obtaining x¯ = 0.0950, s2 =
23.9593. So in this case there is prior-data conflict with the prior on σ2 but not
with the prior on µ. The value of (12) equals 0.9150 which gives no indication
of prior-data conflict with the prior on µ. The tabulated values also indicate no
serious robustness concerns as does
∫∞
0
RB((x¯, σ2) |x)Π1(dσ
−2) = 4.5838. This
also reinforces the claim that the tail probabilities (11) and (12) are measuring
different aspects of the data conflicting with the prior.
Table 9 gives some values ofmQ,T (T (x) |V (T (x)))/mT (T (x) |V (T (x))) when
a sample of n = 20 was generated from a N(10, 1) obtaining x¯ = 9.7941, s2 =
1.0082. So in this case there is prior-data conflict with the prior on µ but not
with the prior on σ2. The value of (12) equals 0.1691 × 10−9 which gives a
clear indication of prior-data conflict with the prior on µ. In this case the tab-
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µ1 τ
2
1
mQ,T (T (x) |V (T (x)))
mT (T (x) |V (T (x)))
µ1 τ
2
1
mQ,T (T (x) |V (T (x)))
mT (T (x) |V (T (x)))
−2 1 0.87 0 2 0.51
−1 1 0.96 0 3 0.34
1 1 0.98 0 4 0.26
2 1 0.90 0 5 0.21
Table 8: The ratio mQ,T (T (x) |V (T (x))))/mT (T (x) |V (T (x))) in Example 3
when there is conflict with the prior on σ2 but not with the prior on µ.
µ1 τ
2
1
mQ,T (T (x) |V (T (x)))
mT (T (x) |V (T (x)))
µ1 τ
2
1
mQ,T (T (x) |V (T (x)))
mT (T (x) |V (T (x)))
−2 1 0.01 0 2 117, 584
−1 1 0.10 0 3 5, 611, 980
1 1 10.83 0 4 26, 012, 609
2 1 132.09 0 5 55, 478, 630
Table 9: The ratio mQ,T (T (x) |V (T (x))))/mT (T (x) |V (T (x))) in Example 3
when there is no conflict with the prior on σ2 but there is with the prior on µ.
ulated values indicate a clear lack of robustness with respect to the prior on
µ. Also,
∫∞
0 RB((x¯, σ
2) |x)Π1(dσ
−2) = 8, 046, 933, 962 indicates that the worst
case behavior with respect to robustness is terrible.
6 Conclusions
Several optimal robustness results have been derived here for relative belief
inferences. These and other results suggest a natural preference for these infer-
ences over other Bayesian inferences for estimation and hypothesis assessment.
Even though relative belief inferences may be the most robust to choice of prior,
this does not guarantee that they are robust in practice. The issue of practi-
cal robustness in a given problem is seen to be connected with whether or not
there is prior-data conflict. With no prior-data conflict the inferences are robust
to small changes in the prior, at least in the sense measured here. This adds
support to the point-of-view that checking for prior-data conflict is an essential
aspect of good statistical practice.
It is interesting that the worst case behavior of the measure of sensitivity
is associated with the maximized value of a relative belief ratio. The actual
maximum value attained is meaningless, however, as there is no way to calibrate
this as opposed to calibrating the relative belief ratio at a fixed value via the
strength. The relative belief estimate is consistent, however, and the relative
belief ratio at this value will, at least in the continuous case, converge to infinity.
So large values would seem to be associated with high evidence in favor. What
has been shown here is that large values can be associated with prior-data
conflict and a lack of robustness rather than providing high evidence. When
prior-data conflict is encountered the prior can be modified, following Evans
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and Jang (2011b), to avoid this. While objections can be raised to taking such
a step, it seems necessary if we want to report a valid characterization of the
evidence obtained.
In Baskurt and Evans (2013) the relationship between relative belief ratios
and Bayes factors is examined. Both serve as measures of evidence but the
relative belief ratio is a simpler, more direct measure and it has many nice
mathematical properties. It is the case too that often relative belief ratios and
Bayes factors agree. For example, in the case of continuous priors, when the
Bayes factor at a point is defined as a limit, then these quantities are the same.
As such, it is reasonable to expect that the results derived here about relative
belief inferences will apply equally well to inferences based on Bayes factors.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 Note first that
Q (A |x) =
∫
A
m(x |ψ)
mq(x)
Q(dψ). (15)
Therefore, using (15),
ΠǫΨ (A |x) =
(1− ǫ)m(x)ΠΨ (A |x) + ǫmq(x)Q (A |x)
(1− ǫ)m(x) + ǫmq(x)
=
ΠΨ (A |x) +
ǫ
(1−ǫ)m(x)
∫
Am(x |ψ)Q(dψ)
1 + ǫ(1−ǫ)m(x)
{∫
Am(x |ψ)Q(dψ) +
∫
Ac m(x |ψ)Q(dψ)
}
≤
ΠΨ (A |x) +
ǫ
(1−ǫ)m(x)
∫
Am(x |ψ)Q(dψ)
1 + ǫ(1−ǫ)m(x)
∫
A
m(x |ψ)Q(dψ)
and the last inequality is an equality when Q(Ac) = 0. Result (i) then follows
since (p+y)/(1+y) = 1−(1−p)/(1+y) is increasing in y ≥ 0 when 1−p > 0 and
clearly supQ
∫
A
m(x |ψ)Q(dψ) = limδ↓0
∫
A
m(x |ψ)Qδ(dψ) = supψ∈Am(x |ψ)
where Qδ places all of its mass on the set {ψ : m(x |ψ) ≥ supψ∈Am(x |ψ) −
δ} ∩ A.
For result (ii) we have that
ΠǫΨ (A |x) ≥
ΠΨ (A |x) +
ǫ
(1−ǫ)m(x)
∫
Am(x |ψ)Q(dψ)
1 + ǫ(1−ǫ)m(x)
{∫
Am(x |ψ)Q(dψ) + supψ∈Ac m(x |ψ)
}
≥
ΠΨ (A |x)
1 + ǫ(1−ǫ)m(x) supψ∈Ac m(x |ψ)
where the first inequality is obvious and the second follows since (p + y)/(1 +
y+ b) = 1− (1− p+ b)/(1+ y+ b) is increasing in y ≥ 0 when 1− p+ b > 0 and
so the minimum is attained at y = 0. The inequalities are equalities whenever
Q(A) = 0. We then argue as in (i).
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For (iii) a direct calculation yields
δ(A) = ΠupperΨ (A |x)−Π
lower
Ψ (A |x)
=
ΠΨ (A |x) (1 + ǫ
∗r(Ac)) + ǫ∗r(A)(1 + ǫ∗r(Ac))−ΠΨ (A |x) (1 + ǫ
∗r(A))
(1 + ǫ∗r(A))(1 + ǫ∗r(Ac))
=
ΠΨ (A |x) ǫ
∗(r(Ac)− r(A))
(1 + ǫ∗r(A))(1 + ǫ∗r(Ac))
+
ǫ∗r(A)
1 + ǫ∗r(A)
.
Result (iv) follows from δ(Ac) = supQ(1−Π
ǫ
Ψ (A |x))−infQ(1−Π
ǫ
Ψ (A |x)) =
supQ(−Π
ǫ
Ψ (A |x))− infQ(−Π
ǫ
Ψ (A |x)) = δ(A).
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